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The role of pension fund administrators in the chilean capital markets and its effects in Corporate Governance The role of pension fund administrators in the chilean capital markets and its effects in Corporate Governance

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Fecha publicación: 01.12.2013
Fecha de modificación: 29.12.2016
Tamaño: 725.65 kB
Imagen 2013

Autores: José Tomás Sáez y Juan Pablo Guzmán

Fecha: 2013

This work has the objective of defining and analyzing the essential characteristics of the Chilean capital market, ruled by a number of economic groups that control a great percentage of the existing corporations. Since 1985, a central cog of this system have been the Pension Fund Administrators (AFP in their Chilean acronym), the main institutional investors. They have led the minority shareholders…

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The role of independent directors in cartel prosecutions The role of independent directors in cartel prosecutions

Fecha publicación: 08.01.2018
Fecha de modificación: 09.01.2018
Tamaño: 699.31 kB
publicación

Autores: Daniel Ferrés, Murillo Campello, Gaizka Ormazabal 

Fecha: 2017

Market reactions to news of cartel prosecutions are muted when indicted firms have a high proportion of independent directors on their boards. Independent directors serving on cartel-indicted firms are penalized by losing board seats and vote support in other firms they serve. Notably, firms with more independent directors are more likely to cooperate with prosecutors through leniency programs. They are also more likely to dismiss scandal-laden CEOs after cartel indictments. Our study shows that cartel prosecution imposes significant, market-based personal costs onto independent directors and that they take actions to mitigate those costs. Our results may inform regulatory actions in antitrust enforcement.

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The Government as a large shareholder: impact on the voting premium The Government as a large shareholder: impact on the voting premium

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Fecha publicación: 04.12.2013
Fecha de modificación: 29.12.2016
Tamaño: 889.01 kB
Imagen web law and economics julio 2014

Autores: Marcelo Fernandes y Walter Novaes

Fecha: 2014

The subprime crisis led to a wave of government interventions in the private sector that has been particularly strong in Europe and Latin America, where several governments are large shareholders in a variety of public firms. In a sense, the subprime crisis induced these governments to behave as active large shareholders. This paper uses a sample of public firms in Brazil to show...

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The effects of Audit Firm Rotation: An event study in Chile The effects of Audit Firm Rotation: An event study in Chile

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Fecha publicación: 13.12.2016
Fecha de modificación: 29.12.2016
Tamaño: 1.34 MB
imagen web the effects

Autores: Antonio Aninat, Álvaro Bustos y Julio Riutort

Fecha: 2016

In order to determine market reactions to an announcement of an audit firm change we carry out an event study between 2004 and 2013 of 65 publicly traded Chilean companies (they represent 95.8% of the non-financial component of the main Chilean Stock Index: IPSA). We find that the market reacted positively when a company announced that it will retain its audit firm for a given year. We rule out possible bias in the informational content of the event...

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The Board of director's duty to monitor in Chile after the Farmacias Ahumada case The Board of director's duty to monitor in Chile after the Farmacias Ahumada case

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Fecha publicación: 13.12.2011
Fecha de modificación: 14.12.2016
Tamaño: 392.76 kB
Imagen web

Autor: Josefina Yávar

Fecha: 2011

In 2009, the directors of Farmacias Ahumada S.A., one of the major Chilean pharmaceutical companies, were fined by the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros for breaching their fiduciary duty to monitor the company’s affairs as a result of which certain antitrust violations were committed by its employees. This case is a landmark in Chilean corporate governance law...

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